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Abstract
Council Regulation No 2988/95 on the protection of the European
Communities’ financial interests continues to give rise to preliminary questions referred
by Member State courts. This is the logical consequence of the structure and organisa-
tion of what is referred to as the ‘PIF’ Regulation (protection des intérêts financiers).
With this Regulation, a general legal framework was created for checking and penal-
ising ‘irregularities’ and fraud that prejudices the European Union budget, to be
carried out by the Member States. Its provisions, which evidently have direct effect
within the national legal orders, may be supplemented by the European sectoral legis-
lator and by national law. Furthermore, the Regulation offers the possibility to depart
from the general rules within certain boundaries, equally in both European sectoral
rules and national rules. Regulation No. 2988/95 thus constitutes a complex, multi-
level (European and national provisions) and multi-source (general and sectoral
European Regulations) legal system aimed at protecting the financial interests of the
European Union against fraud and other illegal acts. This makes it difficult for na-
tional courts to correctly apply the PIF Regulation. The judgment in Pfeifer & Langen
KG shows that, (also) from the perspective of equal conditions for economic operators,
it is desirable to have more detailed European provisions on administrative measures
and the limitation periods relating to the imposition of such measures.
1 Introduction
Enforcement of EU law enjoys high priority within the
European Union. This is especially true for the area of European grants and
subsidies where fraud and irregularities are frequently reported. Continual
negative reporting by the press and the critical Annual Reports of the European
Court of Auditors, year after year, neither contribute to the popularity nor to
the acceptance of the European Union. From the end of the 1980s onwards, it
became more and more clear that the European Union is suffering huge finan-
cial losses, caused in part by the fact that the Member States do not always ef-
fectively carry out such checks and enforcement tasks. As a result of this
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growing awareness, the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) introduced the obligation
for both the Community and the Member States to combat fraud and other il-
legal activities. Nowadays, article 325 TFEU provides that the European Union
and the Member States must counter fraud and any other illegal activities af-
fecting the financial interests of the European Union through measures that
will act as a deterrent. These must be such ‘as to afford effective protection in
the Member States, and in all the Union's institutions, bodies, offices and
agencies’.
In the majority of cases, specific measures to protect the financial interests of
the European Union must be taken by the Member States themselves, while
for the most part implementation of the relevant European policies rests with
them as well. Under the principle of procedural autonomy, enforcement activ-
ities by the Member States are basically governed by their national laws. In the
course of the last decades, however, national enforcement andpenalisation
practices were rapidly ‘Europeanized’ as a result of both restrictions formulated
in European case law and sectoral European legislation. Having started with
the area of Agricultural Policy, the European Union legislature is increasingly
prescribing specific checks, measures and penalties in a variety of policy areas.
The PIF Regulation may be considered an acme in this development. It was
the result of a resolution by the European Parliament, in which the Commission
was asked to propose a general legal framework on European administrative
penalties and a Regulation in which far-reaching powers are laid down with
regard to on the spot checks and inspections by what used to be the Task Force
for the Co-ordination of Fraud Prevention (UCLAF), now the European Anti-
Fraud Office (OLAF). The proposal subsequently issued by the Commission
has caused much debate between the European Parliament, which tightened
the proposal on two occasions, and the Council of Ministers, which did not
adopt any of the amendments in the end.1
Legal history reveals the long-time battle between the European Union and
the Member States regarding enforcement and penalisation. The Member States
put up considerable resistance against the restriction of their freedoms in this
area. In the meantime, a solid foundation was laid in several treaties for
European anti-fraud policies. However, as a result of the very general wording
of the provisions of the PIF Regulation, and the possibility of supplementing
and departing from these, its application is leading to a considerable number
of complex questions in national proceedings. In our view, it is time to take the
See the original Commission Proposal for Regulation No 2988/95 (COM(94) 214 final), the
report of the Budgetary Control Committee (A4-0049/95) and the report of the Budgetary
1
Control Committee ensuing from the Council’s agreement on a common approach
(A4-0296/95).
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next step in European legislation, but before taking up this point we will first
come back to the Pfeifer & Langen KG case and Regulation No 2988/95.
2 Regulation No 2988/95
The preamble of Regulation No 2988/95 clearly states that
‘… acts detrimental to the Communities’ financial interests must […] be
countered in all areas’. In order to enhance combating fraud, the preamble in-
dicates that a common set of legal rules is needed for all areas covered by
Community policies. A number of general principles (mainly a codification of
the Court’s prior case law on the imposition of administrative penalties), gen-
eral provisions on administrative measures and penalties, and a number of
general rules in the area of checks and inspections have therefore been laid
down.
In the first article of the Regulation, the term ‘irregularity’ is defined as ‘any
infringement of a provision of Community law resulting from an act or omission
by an economic operator,2 which has, or would have, the effect of prejudicing
the general budget of the Communities or budgets managed by them, either
by reducing or losing revenue accruing from own resources collected directly
on behalf of the Communities, or by an unjustified item of expenditure.’
The second article underlines a number of basic principles. Measures and
penalties must be ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’; no administrative
penalty may be imposed unless a Community act prior to the irregularity has
provided for it, and, in case of subsequent amendments to provisions, the less
severe provision applies retroactively (lex mitior principle).3 Last but not least,
the article provides that Community law determines the nature and scope of
the administrative measures and penalties with due regard to the nature and
seriousness of the irregularity, the advantage granted or received and the degree
of responsibility. The procedures for the application of Community checks,
measures and penalties are governed by the laws of the Member States (principle
of procedural autonomy) subject, however, to the Community law applicable.
See CJEU 21 December 2011, C-465/10 (Chambre de commerce et d’industrie de l’Indre) in which
the Court ruled that also a legal person governed by public law (as a recipient of a subsidy from
2
the European Union budget), can be treated, for the purposes of applying Regulation No
2988/95, as an economic operator which is alleged to have infringed a provision of European
Union law (par. 45). Confusing in that perspective: GCEU 19 September 2012, T-265/08 (par.
36), in which the General Court states that ‘in essence, Regulation 2988/95 puts in place a
general legal framework intended to combat fraud which, by definition, cannot be committed
by a national authority’.
See ECJ 1 July 2004, C-295/02 (Gisela Gerken), ECJ 4 May 2006, C-286/05 (Reinhold Haug);
ECJ 8 March 2007, C-45/06 (Campina); ECJ 11 March 2008, C-420/06 (Rüdiger Jager). As well
3
as the reference in the preamble to the ne bis in idem principle, which is further expressed in
Article 6 of Regulation No 2988/95, see CJEU 5 June 2012, C-489/10 (Bonda).
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The articles governing the periods of limitation and implementation (art.
3); the form and nature of the measures and penalties (arts. 4 and 5); and their
relation to criminal proceedings (art. 6) are of great relevance for national legal
practice. Article 3 in particular has led to interesting preliminary rulings on the
relation between Regulation No 2988/95, sectoral European regulations and
national (sectoral and general) provisions. The ruling in Pfeifer & Langen KG is
part of this type of case law. It specifically deals with the question as to which
limitation period is applicable to the claim for interest due over amounts unduly
paid. Before analysing the judgment, we will broadly outline the most important
case law preceding the judgment in Pfeifer & Langen KG.
3 Prior Case Law
Several components of the provisions in Article 3 of the PIF
Regulation governing the limitation period have led to preliminary questions
referred to the European Court. More than once, the Court had to ponder, for
instance, the question as to how ‘continuous or repeated irregularities’ are to
be interpreted, for this could be decisive for the moment at which a limitation
period commences.4 On several occasions, the Court was asked to define when
an act of the competent national authorities should be considered an act of in-
vestigation or an act within court proceedings which would interrupt the limi-
tation period.5 Moreover, it only became clear from the Court’s judgments that
the period of limitation laid down in Article 3 is applicable to both the adminis-
trative measures defined in Article 4 and the administrative penalties defined
in Article 5 of the PIF Regulation.6
The prior case law concerning the relation between framework regulations,
sectoral regulations and national provisions on limitation periods is of particular
relevance for the Pfeifer & Langen KG case. In some instances, the sectoral
European legislator is allowed to supplement and on occasion depart from the
Regulation.7 It also allows supplementation of and departure from the Regulation
in national law, in any case by stricter rules. In this context, one of the questions
referred by national courts was about theway in which a different limitation
period was to be laid down in national law: in general law, in provisions specific-
See ECJ 2 December 2004, C-226/03 P (José Marti Peix); ECJ 11 January 2007, C-279/05 (Vonk
Dairy Products) and CJEU 21 December 2011, C-465/10 (Chambre de commerce et d’industrie de
l’Indre).
4
ECJ 24 June 2004, C-278/02 (Handlbauer); CJEU 28 October 2010, C-367/09 (SGS Belgium)
and General Court 15 April 2011, T-297/05 (IPK/Commissie).
5
ECJ 24 June 2004, C-278/02 (Handlbauer).6
See, for instance, Articles 25 and 26 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December
2002 on the implementation of the rules of competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the
Treaty, relating to the limitation period for imposing and enforcing penalties.
7
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ally tailored to penalties in general or to penalties ensuing from established ir-
regularities with regard to European money?8 In the Vosding case, for instance,
the preliminary question asked was whether Article 3 precluded Germany from
applying the longer period of limitation of thirty years that was prescribed by
the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB]). The Court answered
the question in the negative: application of a national term laid down in general
law was permitted. According to the Court, the wording of Article 3 (3) of Reg-
ulation No 2988/95 did not expressly provide an answer to the question as to
whether a longer national term must be found in rules specifically governing
recovery of, in this case, export subsidies, or that a term from a more general
national regulation may be applied.9
Another question answered in case law was the limits set by the legal prin-
ciples of European Union law to the application of alternative national limitation
periods. In its Vosding judgment, the Court held that the principle of legal cer-
tainty did not preclude application of the limitation period laid down in the
German Civil Code with regard to administrative measures, because such ap-
plication had already been established case law practice in Germany before
Regulation No 2988/95 had come into effect. However, there was a sequel to
the Vosding judgment. Perhaps encouraged by the opinion of the Advocate-
General in the Vosding judgment, the German court referred more preliminary
questions in that same case.10 This time, the essence of the questions referred
was whether a period of thirty years was compatible with the principles of legal
certainty and proportionality under European Union law. In the Ze Fu Fleisch-
handel judgment, the Court held, this time based on more comprehensive
reasoning, that application (by analogy) of a national period of limitation – one
that in effect had not been created for the purpose of prosecuting irregularities
(as in Article 3 (1) Regulation No 2988/95), but for the purpose of recovering
advantages wrongly granted – was not incompatible, in principle,with the prin-
ciple of legal certainty.11 It was up to the national court, however, to assess the
extent to which application (by analogy) by the German court of this period of
limitation was foreseeable for the economic operator. The German court did
not have the opportunity to make such an assessment, however, because the
Court also held that Germany was not permitted to apply a term of thirty years,
as a thirty-year term was viewed as too long. The Court first considered that,
according to the European Union legislature, a term of four, or even three years,
was sufficient for the objective pursued, which was prosecution of irregularities
ECJ 29 January 2009, C-278/07 (Vosding).8
It must be noted that in a more recent judgment in Ze Fu Fleischhandel the Court did observe
that it is easier for an economic operator if the period of limitation has been laid down in spe-
cific legislation (CJEU 5 May 2011, C-201 and C-202, par. 33).
9
See the Opinion by the AG E. Sharpton of 25 September 2008, C-278/07, pt. 71 (Vosding).10
CJEU 5 May 2011, C-201/10 and C-202/10 (Ze Fu Fleischhandel).11
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by the national authorities. The Court furthermore considered that a term of
thirty years could encourage the authorities to delay prosecution. In addition,
a term of thirty years would lead to too long a period of legal uncertainty for
economic operators, who would also encounter problems proving their case as
a result. The Court held that a term of thirty years thus exceeded that which
was necessary in prosecuting irregularities. In consequence, the application of
the German general limitation period was not compatible with the principle of
proportionality under European Union law. It became clear from the judgments
in Vosding and Ze Fu Fleischhandel therefore, that the legal principles laid down
in European Union law (also) impose restrictions on the freedom of Member
States to depart from the PIF Regulation.
Interesting finally is the question as to the extent of the departure afforded
to the Member State in national law in cases, in which the European Union
legislature has deviated from the PIF Regulation or has supplemented it in
sectoral law. Do the Member States still have the same degree of freedom in
that event to regulate these matters? Or must it be presumed that there is no
longer such freedom? This was the question referred by a Belgian court in the
Corman judgment. Unfortunately, the European Court of Justice had no oppor-
tunity to provide an answer, because the period in question laid down in the
European sectoral regulation could not be regarded as a (shorter) period of
limitation as referred to in Article 3 (1) of Regulation No 2988/95. In this case,
the European Union legislature had not provided for a special sectoral period
of limitation, so that the general period of limitation of Article 3 (1) of Regulation
No 2988/95 proved to be applicable.12
4 The Pfeifer & Langen KG Case
Pfeifer & Langen KG (P&L) is a large German company that
mainly trades in sugar. The countries of the European Union are amongst the
world’s major sugar producers and the European Union financially supports
producers within certain quotas. Amounts of sugar above these quotas must
be sold on the world market without the aid of export subsidy, or be stored so
that it can be sold in subsequent years on the basis the quotas for those years.
Accordingly, Regulation No 1785/81 provided for a compensation scheme for
storage costs, of which Pfeifer & Langen KG made use. In 2003, when the
German authorities discovered that during the period between 1994 and 1997
P&L had overstated the quantities of sugar in its application for funds, they
decided to recover a sum of money. The recovery decision stated that the sums
reclaimed would bear interest, the precise amount to be fixed in a later decision.
CJEU 22 December 2010, C-131/10 (Corman), par. 33-51.12
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In 2006, after appellate administrative proceedings and in the course of admin-
istrative judicial proceedings (the main proceedings, which are still on-going)
P&L paid the sum of € 469,421.12. In 2007, the German authorities issued an
interest decision: under German law, interest totaling € 298,650.98 was due
on the recovery sum.
P&L proceeded by again bringing the case before the German administrative
courts. The issue in these (second) national proceedings was whether the claim
for interest was (in part) time-barred. Although the German Civil Code provides
for a limitation period with regard to interest claims, the German Federal Ad-
ministrative Court first wished to ascertain whether the limitation period laid
down in Article 3 of Regulation No 2988/95 was applicable. If so, this would
mean that the German period of limitation, which was shorter than the minimal
term of four years prescribed by the PIF Regulation, could not be applied.13
Doubts on this point had arisen by the fact that the German Federal Finance
Court, in a case concerning export refunds, had held, that Article 3 applied to
the limitation period for interest linked to the reimbursement of sums wrongly
received within the meaning of the measures laid down in Article 4 of the PIF
Regulation. The German Administrative Court therefore referred the following
preliminary question to the European Court (paragraph 34):
‘Does Article 3 of [Regulation No 2988/95] apply also to the limitation period
for claims in respect of interest due under national law in addition to the repay-
ment of the advantage wrongly obtained on the basis of an irregularity?’
5 The Court’s Ruling
Before arriving at an answer to the (first) preliminary question,
the Court dealt with the fundamental question as to whether on the basis of
national rules Member States were permitted to charge interest in recovering
European monies unduly paid, where the European Union legislature had not
provided for such a provision. Relevant here isArticle 4, (1) and (2) of Regulation
No 2988/95, which provides that as a general rule ‘irregularities’ will involve
withdrawal of the wrongly obtained advantage by an obligation to pay or repay
the amounts due or wrongly received, and that the necessary measures will be
limited to the withdrawal of the advantage obtained plus interest – on a flat-rate
basis – ‘where so provided for’. In the P&L case, none of the relevant European
regulations contained a provision on interest.
See ECJ 24 July 2004, C-278/02 (Handlbauer), paras 24-35.13
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According to the Court, the provision did not preclude national authorities
from applying national provisions on interest claims in this type of situation.
The Court referred to its 1982 judgment in Fromme (Case 54/81).
46 As regards, first, the very principle of the collection of interest being provided
for by national law in a situation where European Union law did not provide
for the collection of such interest, the Court has held that it was compatible
with European Union law, when recovering an advantage wrongly received
from the European Union budget, for a Member State to recover, in accordance
with its national law, interest which, in the absence at that time of rules requiring
it to be paid to the Community, accrued to its own budget (see Case 54/81
Fromme [1982] ECR 1449, paragraph 8).
47 The same must be true where that interest, the collection of which is
not required by European Union law, is, in the context of measures financed
by the EAGGF, refunded to the European Union budget. Therefore, in such a
situation, as in the main proceedings, European Union law, in particular Article
4(2) of Regulation No 2988/95, does not preclude the Member States from
providing in their national law for the recovery of default and/or compensatory
interest, in addition to recovering advantages wrongly received from the
European Union budget, which is, in the context of measures financed by the
EAGGF, refunded to the European Union budget.
The Court added that, since the claim for interest, added to the recovery of the
financial advantage, was based on national law, it was also for the national leg-
islator to lay down the methods and conditions applicable to the recovery de-
cision. Although it may be inferred from this that the limitation rules of Article
3 of Regulation No 2988/95 are not applicable, the Court expressly dealt with
this point as follows:
50. In that regard, while the recovery of an advantage wrongly received from
the European Union budget is subject to the limitation rules laid down by Article
3 of Regulation No 2988/95, it is not however apparent from the wording of
that provision or the scheme of the regulation that those rules are intended to
govern the recovery of interest where, as is the case in the main proceedings,
the recovery of that interest is required, in any event, not by sectoral rules but
by national law.
The limitation period for proceedings such as the recovery of the wrongly re-
ceived storage costs is therefore governed by Article 3 of the PIF Regulation,
whereas the limitation period with regard to the additional interest claim
provided for by German law is governed by German law. The limitation periods
for the two claims are not entirely disconnected, however. The Court stated
that, because of the incidental nature of the claim for interest, it could not be
recovered where the principal recovery claim was time-barred (paragraph 51).
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In this respect, there is an ‘indirect link’ between Article 3 of Regulation No
2988/95 and the expiration of a claim for interest ensuing from the national
law. Finally, the Court recalled that under Article 325 TFEU the Member States
are obliged to take measures to counter fraud that prejudices the European
Union budget equal to those taken to tackle fraud affecting the national budget.
6 Analysis
On the basis of the foregoing, it may be concluded that the
Court interpreted Article 4 (2) of Regulation No 2988/95 in such a way that
the expression ‘where so provided for’ is to be taken to mean either a sectoral
European provision on interest claims or a national one. According to the Court,
the European Union legislature did not intended to give exclusive competence
to define interest provisions to the sectoral European Union legislature. In cases
where the European sectoral legislator did not provide for claims for interest
in addition to recovery decisions, the Member States were at liberty to enact a
new provision or to apply an existing (general) provision allowing the charge
of interest in recovery proceedings. The Member State is even under an obliga-
tion to do so where this is standard procedure in national recovery proceedings.
The limitation period for interest claims is then governed by national law,
however, it is not permitted to claim interest if the possibility of recovery of the
wrongly received advantage is time-barred.
In theory, the Court could have arrived at another conclusion regarding the
legal basis of the claim for interest. After all, at the time of the Fromme judgment,
the applicable Community law did not provide for any rules on the collection
of interest in recovery proceedings. The Court in this case ignored that the
general Regulation No 2988/95 had been defined afterwards. Its aim was to
introduce ‘general rules […..] Relating to homogeneous checks and to administrative
measures and penalties concerning irregularities with regard to Community’ (see
Article 1 (1) of Regulation No 2988/95 and the Court in paragraph 36 of this
judgment). Furthermore, Article 2 (3) of Regulation No 2988/95 departs from
the principle that Community law determines ‘the nature and scope of the ad-
ministrative measures and penalties necessary for a correct application of the
rules in question, having regard to the nature and seriousness of the irregularity,
the advantage granted or received, as well as the degree of responsibility.’ Article
4 provides that, as a general rule, any irregularity involves withdrawal of the
wrongly obtained advantage and that ‘where so provided for’, interest may be
charged. Only where procedures for the application of Community measures
are concerned, does the Regulation refer to national laws.
Given these facts, the Court could have ruled that the (sectoral) European legis-
lator had exclusive competence. In that case, the collection of interest (an ad-
143Review of European Administrative Law 2013-1
CLAIMS FOR INTEREST IN THE FIGHT AGAINST FRAUD TO THE UNION’S FINANCIAL INTERESTS
ministrative measure as referred to in Article 4 of Regulation No 2988/95)
would only be possible where the European Union legislature had provided for
a legal basis in EU sectoral rules. The advantages of this approach are that more
legal certainty would have been provided for economic operators and that their
actions would have been governed by the same enforcement rules.
This outcome would not have been very obvious, however. The Court seems
to attach rather more importance to combating fraud and irregularities than to
achieving a common legal framework and uniform punitive practices for the
Member States.14 In this context, it has always given priority to the procedural
autonomy enjoyed by the Member States in enforcement decisions. In solid
case law, it has allowed stricter national measures than required under European
Union law.15 It fits with this type of case law to permit Member States to them-
selves create a legal basis for claims for interest. In effect, the Court in such
case law focuses on maximum protection of the European Union budget, rather
than giving preference to legal certainty and equal market conditions for eco-
nomic operators.
The Court could also have arrived at a different decision with regard to the
question as to which limitation rules are applicable. Advocate-General Sharpton,
in the good company of the European Commission, took the view, for instance,
that Article 3 of Regulation No 2988/95 was also applicable to interest claims
provided for in national law. She underpins this view (paragraphs 61-73) with
the observation that the purpose of collecting interest in these cases is consistent
with the objectives of the Regulation, namely to compensate the European
Union budget for the time that it was unable to make use of the recovered sum
in question and to eliminate any advantage P&L might have enjoyed as the re-
cipients of overpayments. Thus, the measure fell within the notion of ‘proceed-
ings’ as referred to in Article 3 Regulation No 2988/95. According to Sharpston,
as a consequence, the four-year period laid down in Article 3 (1) of Regulation
No 2988-95 governs the limitation period in respect of claims for interest made
under national law, where a wrongful advantage is obtained as a result of an
irregularity.
The Court did not adopt the view of the Advocate-General in this respect.
As has been referred to above, the Court considered that, in principle, the
Member States have to define the modalities and conditions where interest is
collected on the basis of national law. Where European Union law does not
provide for limitation rules for the collection of interest, the national rules apply.
However, the incidental nature of the interest charge leads to the ‘indirect’ re-
striction, that upon expiration of the principal claim, (pursuant to Article 3 of
See, for a recent example, CJEU 13 December 2012, C-670/11 (FranceAgriMer).14
Recently in CJEU 24 May 2012, C-188/11 (Hehenberger).15
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Regulation No 2988/95 or sectoral rules) the possibility of collecting interest
no longer exists.
As previously stated, it was precisely its incidental nature that constituted an
argument for the Advocate-General to assume that Article 3 of Regulation No
2988/95 did apply directly to the interest claim ensuing from a recovery decision.
Although in view of the close link between the principal claim and the claim
for interest this reasoning may be acceptable, it is our view that the Court’s
approach is to be preferred as it leads to (more) clear regulation of interest
claims in these type of cases: the provisions of the PIF Regulation are not suited
to be readily applied to interest claims. Claims for interest cannot be made, for
instance, at the time the irregularity was committed, as Article 3 of the Regula-
tion seems to suggest. The Regulation does not even provide for the most basic
rules on interest claims, such as the rate of interest to be charged. The approach
taken by the Advocate-General would therefore result in a ‘complex’ situation,
in which the duration of the limitation period is determined by Article 3 (1) of
Regulation No 2988/95, whereas all other aspects would be governed by rules
of national law to be applied in conformity with the Member States’ general
obligation under Article 325 TFEU and the general principles of European
Union law.
As limitation rules imply interaction between provisions on the commencement,
duration and interruption of the term, it makes more sense, in our view, as a
rule to ‘fully’ regulate limitation rather than making it up from several legal
regimes. The individual components, such as duration, commencement and
interruption of the term, are after all interdependent. Choices in relation to
these components are contingent on the nature of the specific claim and the
interests the legislator aims to serve or protect. If fraud or any other irregularity
is characterised as very serious, there will be a need for rules that prescribe a
longer, rather than a shorter, period of limitation for the power to prosecute.
If, in addition to this, the legislator also wishes to encourage the authorities
entrusted with enforcement and carrying out checks to speed up the prosecution
for irregularities, a shorter limitation period that allows for relative easy inter-
ruption, is indicated.16 A legal regime ‘composed’ of different (European and
national) rules fails to do justice to a full weighing up of the choices that form
the basis of a specific set of rules. The balance between the individual compon-
ents will be distorted and parts of the various limitation systems will be applied
to situations for which they were not intended. Sharpston also notes the need
for a package of rules governing the limitation period for interest claims
(paragraph 81). The Court therefore rightly opted for a practical solution whereby
Cf. CJEU 5 March 2011, C-201 and C-202, par. 44 (Ze Fu Fleischhandel).16
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the limitation period of the principal claim is solely governed by Article 3 of
Regulation No 2988/95, with the possible application of a longer term under
national law, and the limitation period of the claim for interest is solely governed
by national law (unless the principal claim is time-barred).
7 In Conclusion: More European Rules Please
The Pfeifer & Langen KG case illustrates that a general frame-
work regulation at the European level easily leads to complex legal questions,
in particular where other legislators are allowed considerable freedom to sup-
plement the Regulation and depart from it. The PIF Regulation is rather sparse
and lacking in detail. It offers little clear and directive indication of the scope
of the individual provisions. The same is true for the way in which, and the
limits within which, the Member States may depart from the Regulation.
Questions of a fundamental nature often have to be answered by the CJEU.
Frequently, the Advocate-General and the Court arrive at different answers, as
was the case in Pfeifer & Langen KG concerning the application of Article 3 (1)
of Regulation No 2988/95 to interest claims based in national law.
Not only does the limited development of the Regulation produce uncertainty
about its interpretation and its relation to the national law of the Member States
but it also leads to differentiation between the Member States in those parts
where, in our view, conformity is called for. The Court’s view in Pfeifer & Langen
KG shows that whether or not interest is claimed in recovery proceedings de-
pends on the Member State in which financial aid from the European Union
budget is requested. It becomes clear from the judgment that the amounts
concerned are not insignificant. It is desirable to achieve uniformity in this
area. This may not only be concluded as a result of the Court’s judgment but
this point is also argued by the Advocate-General Sharpston in paragraph 79
of her opinion. In a recent Special Report, the European Court of Auditors also
recommends harmonisation of the rules in relation to the recovery of undue
payments made under the Common Agricultural Policy, with the inclusion of
the collection of interest.17
After seventeen years, it is time to revise Regulation No 2988/95: it needs
to be brought up to date in line with the Court’s case law. It would be advisable
to tighten the general rules, whereby attention is paid to creating equal condi-
tions and providing legal certainty for economic operators, in addition to pro-
tecting the financial interests of the European Union. An interesting proposal
for a Directive on the fight against fraud to the Union's financial interests by
European Court of Auditors, Recovery of undue payments made under the Common Agricultural
Policy, Special Report No. 8/2011 (at www.eca.europa.eu).
17
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means of criminal law has recently been made by the European Commission.18
It is an attempt to reduce the risks of divergent national practices and to ensure
a uniform interpretation and a homogeneous way to meet all the necessary
prosecution requirements in cases of fraud, corruption, money laundering and
obstruction of public procurement procedures. Divergent approaches should
also be avoided in administrative national practices.19
COM(2012) 363 /2, http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/documents/pif-report/pif_proposal_en.pdf.18
This point is argued again by AG Sharpston in par. 48 of her Opinion in the Agroferm Case
of 24 Januari 2013 (Case 568/11).
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